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 “Heroism” in Warfare 
As a Functionally Specific Form of Altruism. 
 
 
“When two tribes of primeval man, living in the same country, came into competition, the tribe 
including the greater number of courageous, sympathetic and faithful members…would without 
doubt succeed best and conquer the others.”  Darwin, The Descent of Man, chapter 5, p. 156. 
 
 
 
 
Abstract 
The willingness of people to risk their lives fighting on behalf of their nation (which we call 
heroism) is a background assumption in the study of war, thus of international relations, but also 
an evolutionary puzzle.  We use two computer simulations to explore the possibility that heroism 
could have evolved as a domain specific form of altruism, selected through humans’ ancient past 
as a consequence of warfare.  In the first, “altruism” is modeled as a generalized disposition that 
promotes both heroism and other, non-military, forms of group-benefiting behaviors—which we 
call communitarianism. In the second, heroism and communitarianism are modeled as domain 
specific dispositions free to evolve independently.  Warfare promotes weak selection on 
generalized altruism, somewhat stronger selection on communitarianism, and substantial 
selection on heroism.  Heroism evolves more readily when groups are small and relatively equal 
in size.  However, the level of evolved heroism is unaffected by whether war is rare or common. 
An analytic model indicates that heroism should evolve to higher levels when the rate of 
casualties in defeated groups is high.  Our results suggest why special purpose modes of altruism 
might evolve more readily than a generalized propensity for altruistic behavior. 
 
 When Homer asks in the Iliad “What god drove them to fight with such a fury?” he was 
posing a question that remains problematic three thousand years later: What makes soldiers 
willing to fight at great personal risk for their polis, their tribe, their ethnic group, or their 
country? There is no doubt that soldiers often do fight in this manner.  In spectacular cases, of 
course, they have invited almost certain death by, for example, throwing themselves on grenades 
in order to save their comrades,1 but the history of warfare is, in large part, the history of 
ordinary men (and, in recent times, women) who willingly confronted the risk of death when 
fighting for their tribe, country, or other group. In the present paper we call this behavior 
“heroism.”  Heroism is well recognized as a potential human behavior, but the existence of 
heroism is most commonly treated as a background assumption in examining the nature of war. 
In this paper we address what we see as the central puzzle of heroism: How could it have 
evolved? 
 Most studies that address the puzzle of why people are willing to fight on behalf of a 
group have focused on  “proximate” answers—emotional, cognitive or other mechanisms that 
prompt such behavior in the here and now.  Thus, for example, loyalties to small groups of 
                                                 
1   Stories about such behavior are not apocryphal.  According to Holmes (1985, p. 300), “Of the 
eight medals won by Marines on Peleliu in 1944, six were awarded to men who covered 
grenades with their bodies to save their comrades….”  And, quoting a history of the US Marine 
Corps by Robert Moskin: “Five black Marines earned the Medal of Honor in Vietnam.  All five 
were killed shielding their fellow Marines from exploding enemy grenades.”  Not all who did 
this were actually killed; Holmes reports that two winners of the Medal of Honor in Korea 
survived having thrown themselves on grenades.  Yet the risk of death from such action is, 
clearly, very high.  
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fighting comrades (Gat, 1999; Shills & Janowitz, 1948; Stern, 1995) or, perhaps, a regiment 
(Holmes, 1985), the rage and fear provoked by an attack, or threat of an attack, against one’s 
own group (Horowitz, 2001), and cognitive errors such as overconfidence about the risks 
involved in heroism (D. D. P. Johnson, 2004; D. D. P. Johnson et al., 2006; Wrangham, 1999b) 
are all well known to support such behavior.   
But this level of explanation is only part of the story, the other part being the “ultimate” 
or “evolutionary” processes that could have selected for such proximate mechanisms through 
evolutionary time.  While most theorizing in the social sciences invokes only proximate 
mechanisms, those must have been put in place by some evolutionary process—perhaps 
selection on genes alone, perhaps on cultural patterns, perhaps on an interaction between genes 
and culture—meaning that a full explanation of the behavior in question should include both 
proximate and evolutionary processes.  Here we focus on the ultimate, evolutionary question:  
How could proximate mechanisms supporting “heroism” have been positively selected during 
humans’ remote ancestral past?  Since, by definition, heroism involves a fitness cost to the 
individual (increased risk of death) but a benefit to other individuals in the group (greater chance 
of survival) we might expect it to be selected against, eventually disappearing from a population. 
Yet heroism certainly does happen with some frequency across all cultures, suggesting that it is a 
species typical trait. How could this be? 
 How altruism in general might evolve is, of course, a major question in evolutionary 
biology, and the several well-developed, classic answers seem likely to be part of the explanation 
for heroism more specifically.  These include inclusive fitness or “kin selection” (Hamilton, 
1964) which shows how altruistic dispositions can evolve through relatedness between the 
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altruist and the recipient of an altruistic act,2 and reciprocal altruism (Trivers, 1971), which 
shows how proximate mechanisms supporting “other benefiting” behavior can evolve via 
exchange relationships (see also Axelrod, 1984).  More recently, theories of multi-level selection 
have been developed showing how altruistic dispositions can evolve as a consequence of the 
positive impact of altruistic behavior on group success and the subsequent schism of successful 
groups (most notably, Sober & Wilson, 1998). These models are not inconsistent with each 
other,3 and each of them—separately or in conjunction with the others—could well be part of an 
explanation for heroism as one expression of an evolved, generalized disposition to altruism.  In 
these terms, a general purpose altruistic disposition would be as likely to prompt heroism as it 
would be to prompt any other altruistic behavior. 
                                                 
2   Hamilton’s rule is that altruism can evolve by this means under the condition rb > c, that is 
when the benefit to the recipient (b) multiplied by the relatedness of the recipient to the altruist 
(r) is greater than the cost (c) to the altruist.  Inclusive fitness has been invoked by Alexander 
(1979) and also Shaw and Wong (1989) in their pioneering attempts to understand the genetic 
basis of humans’ propensity to warfare.  Importantly, none of these processes—or the possibility 
we will develop here—implies a mechanical or “deterministic” link between evolved cognitive 
mechanisms and behavior; as is well developed (e.g., by Geary, 2005; Marcus, 2004), such 
mechanisms characteristically operate on a contingent If (environment) then (emotion) basis, 
with behavior a product of complex  interactions.  
3   Thus, Humphrey (1997) has argued persuasively that inclusive fitness and reciprocity “…have 
their roots in just one genetic trait: namely, a trait that is nothing else than a trait for behaving 
altruistically to others who share this trait.” (Italics in the original.)  Similarly, inclusive fitness 
and reciprocity have been argued to be, in effect, multilevel selection models in their own right.  
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 We develop the possibility that heroism could have evolved as a “domain specific” form 
of altruism in response to warfare in our ancestral past, rather than as an expression of a 
generalized propensity for altruistic behavior.  The idea that human cognitive architecture 
consists, in substantial part, of functionally specific information processing modules is standard 
in evolutionary psychology and in cognitive neuroscience more broadly, and although 
differences exist between those arguing for a strong version of modularity (notably Cosmides & 
Tooby, 1994; Hirschfeld & Gelman, 1994; Sperber, 1994) and those seeing the possibility of at 
least some measure of domain generality (notably Buller, 2005; Fodor, 2000; Mithen, 1996), 
there is now a widespread acceptance that the human brain has a substantially domain specific 
architecture, incorporating multiple highly specialized information processing mechanisms.  The 
standard argument for the evolution of strong modularity is given by Cosmides and Tooby (1994 
p. 89) as follows:  
…different adaptive problems require different solutions…  Speed, 
reliability, and efficiency can be engineered into specialized mechanisms 
because there is no need to engineer a compromise between competing task 
demands…As a rule, when two adaptive problems have solutions that are 
incompatible or simply different, a single general solution will be inferior to 
two specialized solutions. 
The critics of this strong modularity position do not so much reject its basic logic as propose 
ways by which it must be qualified given the evidence for some selection on domain general 
mechanisms. 
However this argument plays itself out, the extensive literature on altruism has, 
to our knowledge, focused exclusively on the problem of how a generalized 
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disposition to altruistic behavior might have evolved and not on the possibility of 
domain specific altruistic dispositions having evolved independently, each in response 
to a distinctive adaptive problem, and each producing, therefore, at least somewhat 
different proximate mechanisms. Since heroism is, by definition, an altruistic response 
on behalf of one’s group in the event of a violent conflict with some other group, its 
task demands would appear prima facie quite distinct from those of other altruisms 
(e.g., providing food and to others at some personal cost, caring for the sick)—
meaning that heroism could have evolved on its own distinct trajectory and 
independently of such other forms.   
Further, our interest is in the possibility that warfare itself has been the agent of 
selection in this case.  Warfare is, by definition, a group-level phenomenon and, while its 
broad outcomes (victory, defeat, and standoff) are also group-level phenomena, these 
outcomes can have major consequences for the evolutionary success of the individuals 
comprising such groups. Most obviously, those who do the fighting in the group’s wars 
run the risk of dying as a result, reducing the probability that their genes will pass on to 
the next generation, but all group members—those who fight as well as those who do 
not—can also suffer “genetic death” should the group be defeated.  Conversely, should 
the group be victorious, those who survive stand to benefit significantly: Quite apart from 
males’ sexual access to females from the defeated group (viz: rape, captured concubines 
etc.), the spoils of victory can include access to the defeated group’s territory and 
whatever resources that territory contains. Clearly, frequent warfare during humans’ 
ancestral past could have had major adaptive consequences—positive and negative—for 
5 
individuals in the warring groups.4  Since heroism as we have defined it is central to the 
outcome of wars, the evolution of heroism is a good candidate for being among those 
consequences.   
How frequent was warfare in our ancestral past? Attempts to answer this question 
have provoked a good deal of controversy.  Some accounts of the archeological record 
suggest that war was quite frequent.  LeBlanc (2003, pp. xii - xiii), for example, 
comments: 
                                                 
4    A growing literature has addressed multi-level selection on normative systems and 
institutions, some of it paying particular attention to warfare as the agent of selection.  Soltis, 
Boyd and Richerson (1995), for example, used the extensive ethnographic literature on New 
Guinea to assess whether warfare and associated group extinctions had been sufficiently frequent 
to account for the evolution of group-benefiting normative and institutional patterns, concluding 
that it had not;  for such selective processes to have significantly influenced even one such group 
attribute, between 500 and 1000 years would have been necessary.  Other work assessing the 
selective impact of warfare in multi-level terms includes Dawson (1999) and Richerson and 
Boyd (1998), and on multi-level selection more generally, see importantly Sober and Wilson 
(1998). Our interest is in selection as consequence of warfare on the individual attribute heroism, 
thus on genes (or, more realistically, on complex interactions among multiple genes) not on 
group-level attributes, such as normative systems or institutions.  By comparison with selection 
on genes, cultural group selection can magnify phenotypic variation among groups while 
diminishing it within groups (Boyd & Richerson, 1985), meaning any finding that warfare 
selects for individual attributes will be conservative by comparison to what might be expected 
from cultural group selection, or any interaction between that and selection on genes.  
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Just how common was warfare in the past?  I have finally concluded that 
warfare was quite common in the past, and that my findings on three 
continents and within multiple time periods were not a fluke but the norm. 
This has led me to reason that if conflict was common, then it must have 
been an important occurrence in the course of human history. (Italics in the 
original.) 
And with respect to the outcomes of warfare for the defeated populations, in a book that covers 
much the same territory as LeBlanc’s, Keeley (1997, p. 93.) observes that the estimate of 100 
million deaths from war-related causes in the 20th Century is 
…twenty times smaller than the losses that might have resulted if the 
world’s population were still organized into bands, tribes, and chiefdoms.  
A typical tribal society lost about .5 percent of its population in combat 
each year. Applying this casualty rate to the earth’s twentieth-century 
populations predicts more than 2 billion war deaths since 1900. (Italics in 
the original.) 
Other authors have developed the same general theme (e.g., Carman & Harding, 1999; Martin & 
Frayer, 1997; Rice & LeBlanc, 2001), and Goodall’s (1986) discovery that male chimpanzees 
sometimes engage in deadly raids and ambushes against neighboring populations raises the 
possibility that warfare among hominids may go back perhaps five or more million years, at least 
to our common ancestor with chimpanzees. (See also Alexander, 1979; Low, 1993; Wilson & 
Wrangham, 2003; Wrangham & Peterson, 1996). 
 There are, of course, qualifications. First, there were almost certainly times and places in 
which warfare was not “constant.” To the extent that war was a consequence of group 
7 
competition over adaptively important resources, we would expect very little warfare after 
humans colonized new areas.  That appears to have been the case for a many generations after 
humans first migrated into the Americas (Hass, 1999, p. 14.; See also Wolf, 2001), and in East 
Polynesia warfare was similarly rare among founding populations—although it increased as 
populations grew and competition for resources mounted accordingly (Kennett, Anderson, 
Prebble, Conte, & Southon, In press; Kirch, 1984).  The present analysis is based only on the 
possibility that warfare was sufficiently constant during our ancestral past to exert some selective 
pressure on heroism.  We will return to just how constant warfare must have been for that to 
happen.  
 Second, disputes exist among anthropologists about the frequency of ancestral warfare 
under any demographic and resource-related circumstances. Fry (2006), for example, takes issue 
with authors such as LeBlanc and Keeley who, in his view, are simply expressing modern 
cultural beliefs about human nature being “essentially violent and warmongering” thus 
suggesting that war is as a result “natural,” and emphasizes as an alternative perspective “the 
human potential for peace.” (P. 2.) Whether Fry is correctly characterizing the position taken 
about human nature by these authors (and we think he is not), the empirical issue is the incidence 
of warfare in the ancestral past, not humans’ capacity for peaceful cooperation—which we think 
is obvious, being well developed across several disciplines—making Fry’s and related arguments 
(e.g., Fuentes, 2004; Sponsel, 1996) beside the point.   
 Happily, however, we do not have to referee any argument among anthropologists about 
the incidence of warfare in our remote, ancestral past. Few scholars dispute that warfare—or, 
more broadly, “coalitional violence”—has been present, at least to some extent, throughout that 
past, and the question here is whether warfare, happening with any significant frequency, could 
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have selected for heroism.  The simulations that we will now describe allow us to study the 
relationship between frequency of warfare and such selection, and we will report findings to that 
effect later in the paper. 
Two Simulations 
 In the first simulation, altruism is domain general, performing two functions: (1) It 
promotes communitarianism—increasing the mean fitness of group members by group-
benefiting behaviors that do not include fighting; and (2) it promotes heroism, contributing 
thereby to the group’s success in warfare. In the second simulation, these two functions are 
performed by two independently evolving domain-specific attributes. A formal description of the 
two simulations can be found in Appendix 1; here we describe the key features of the simulations 
verbally.  
Model 1:  Domain general altruism 
 Groups and resources. Four groups each occupy a fixed resource base on which its 
members are critically dependent for nourishment.  The size of the resource base for each group 
is a parameter; it may vary across groups but not across time and—because individuals must 
consume such resources in order for them to survive and reproduce—it sets a limit on sustainable 
group size.  
 Altruism. Each group member has a propensity to behave altruistically, which is modeled 
as a continuous variable with values between 0 (never) and 1 (always).  The starting mean 
altruism of each group is a parameter of the model; the altruistic propensity of a group’s 
members varies in a uniform distribution centered at the specified mean.  An individual’s 
altruism increases the reproductive success of all group members and contributes to the group’s 
success in warfare as a function of that individual’s particular altruism score (the more altruistic, 
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the more benefit to others across both domains); the reproductive cost paid by the individual is 
similarly a function of that score (the more altruistic, the greater the cost to self).  
 Baseline Fertility and Individual Reproduction.  Baseline fertility is the probability of 
each group member’s having an offspring in a given generation—prior to any adjustments based 
on the incidence of altruism in the group (the more altruism summed across all group members, 
the greater each group member’s probability of reproducing), the individual’s own altruism score 
(the greater that score, the smaller the probability of that individual’s reproducing), or the 
outcome of war (group members who do not survive wars do not reproduce). Should there be 
more than one war in a generation, the cost of participating (reduced probability of surviving to 
reproduce) is assessed separately for each.   
 Going to War. A group goes to war when its population exceeds the carrying capacity of 
the resource base—that is, when the resource base per capita drops below a specified threshold.  
At this point the only way in which a group can support its members is to capture the resources 
held by another group.  Target groups are chosen at random from among the other groups, with 
any group that is attacked by another having to defend itself by fighting.  
 Particular wars, of course, often have highly visible proximate “triggering events” (the 
seduction of Helen, the assassination of the Archduke Ferdinand), but the visibility of such 
proximate events is not inconsistent with a more ultimate explanation in terms of population 
pressures on groups’ resources (Shaw & Wong, 1989, p.11). There are doubtless causes of war 
other than scarce economic resources; Chagnon (1988) and others, for example, point to the 
frequency with which capturing females is the stated reason for hunter-gatherers going to war.  It 
is also clear that tribes, societies, and nations do not necessarily go to war even if some or many 
of their members are starving.  However, the idea that resource stress increases the likelihood of 
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war (even if it does not serve as the direct trigger for war) is widely assumed among 
anthropologists, biologists, ethologists, political scientists, psychologists, sociologists and others 
addressing the ultimate causes of warfare (e.g., Alcock, 1978; Carneiro, 1970; Durham, 1976; 
Eibl-Eibesfeldt, 1979; Kennett et al., In press; Lambert, 1997; Lambert & Walker, 1991; Shaw & 
Wong, 1989; Thayer, 2004; van den Berghe, 1978; Wilson & Wrangham, 2003). David Geary 
(2005) makes the point succinctly: 
As our ancestors improved in their ability to secure resources from 
the ecology, the primary problem became staying in control of the 
best ecologies—that is, keeping other humans from securing the 
same ecological resources. (P. 7) 
Warfare as a means for ensuring control over scarce resources is, of course, not unfamiliar in 
modern times, and it is the starting point of our model. 
 Victory and Defeat. The group with the highest summed altruism score wins.  This 
represents the total amount of heroic fighting available within each group.  Consistent with the 
“imbalance of power” hypothesis developed by biologists and primatologists (Alexander, 1979; 
Wrangham, 1999a)—as well as with Napoleon’s comment that “God is on the side of large 
armies”—the larger group will win when the mean propensity to altruism is equal across two 
contending groups.  However, a smaller population can defeat a larger one if its members are 
substantially more altruistic (hence more heroic).     
 Death. Some proportion of the defeated group is killed, and we will report our findings 
initially from the strong assumption that all are killed, thus that defeated populations are 
eliminated from the evolving population. We should remember that, while this extreme case is 
certainly reflected in the historical record (Potidaea, Mytilene, and Melos in the Peloponnesian 
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war, for example), victorious groups, when considering how to treat those they have defeated, 
are also capable of keeping a strategic eye on the resource gains (females as well as land) that are 
more or less available to them as a result of their efforts.  As Betzig (2005, p. 335) sets out the 
Biblical case from Deuteronomy 20:13-17: 
God handed Moses two different laws about spoils. One was for wars with 
close neighbors; the other was for more remote wars.  When their enemies 
lived far away, he said, ‘you shall put all the males to the sword, but the 
women and the little ones, the cattle, and everything else in the city, all its 
spoil, you shall take as booty for yourselves.’ But when their enemies lived 
nearby, ‘you shall save alive nothing that breathes, but you shall utterly 
destroy them.’ Land was the limiting factor. 
We explore the importance of this “genocide” parameter analytically in a later section. 
In the simulation, members of the victorious group migrate to the newly captured 
territory such that per-capita resources in the two areas are equalized. Once migration is 
complete, no “memory” of prior ties persists, so the two “daughter” groups created by the schism 
are just as likely to attack one another in subsequent rounds as they are to attack a different 
group.  
 Variation. Selection on altruism—as on any other attribute—can, of course, only happen 
in the context of variation in that attribute.  As noted, members of each group vary in altruism at 
the start of the simulation.  During reproduction, there are two mechanisms by which variation is 
maintained.  One models random mutation (defined as 1M  in the appendix). By default, 
mutation occurs in less than one percent of offspring, and can result in the offspring having an 
altruism level quite different from the parent. The other (defined as 2M ) simulates (without 
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directly modeling) sexual reproduction, such that offspring resemble their parent within a range 
of variability.   
Model 2: Domain specific with both “communitarianism” and “heroism”  
 The second simulation has the same structure as the domain general one, except that each 
individual is characterized by two domain specific altruistic propensities, heroism and 
communitarianism, each similarly modeled as varying between 0 and 1.  Starting mean heroism 
and communitarianism for each group are separate parameters of the model. Member levels for 
the two attributes are independently drawn from a uniform distribution centered at the specified 
mean. Reproductive costs from communitarianism are paid every generation; those from heroism 
are paid per war.   
Method 
 We ran 10,000 simulations of each of the two models.  To ensure that the data we report 
reflect a wide variety of possible evolutionary environments, the following parameters were 
drawn randomly5 for each run:  
1. Each group’s resource endowment ( gR )—specified separately for each group;  
2. Baseline fitness—the probability of reproductive success for all agents before the 
consequences of altruism, communitarianism, heroism or warfare are incorporated ( );   bP
3. The fitness advantage to group members from an individual’s communitarianism ( ); cP
4. The cost to the individual agent of its communitarianism ( );   CC
                                                 
5   From a multivariate uniform distribution with an identity correlation matrix with 
, , , , ,  ( ,  ~ U[50,100]gR ~ U[0,0.5]bP ~ U[0,0.5]CP ~ U[0,0.1]Cc ~ U[0,0.1]Hc ~ U[0,1]AS CS
HS  for the two attribute model), , . ]005.0,0[~1 UM ]05.0,0[~2 UM
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5. The cost to the individual agent of its heroism ( HC );  
6. (In Model 1) Mean starting altruism ( ); AS
7. (In Model 2) Mean starting communitarianism and heroism ( , CS HS ); 
8. The two sources of variation (two types of mutation) in the attributes of offspring as 
specified in the appendix ( 1M , 2M ). 
 Two parameters were fixed across all the simulations: the survival threshold, 1T =  (one 
unit of resource per capita), and the number of groups, which was always four.6  
 Each simulation was run for 1100 generations, with the first thousand generations in each 
case discarded to ensure that the system had evolved away from the diverse starting values.  For 
the last 100 generations we recorded simulation parameters and a moving average of the 
dependent variables—altruism in the domain general model, and communitarianism and heroism 
in the domain specific model.  We also recorded the frequency of wars across all generations for 
each run. We ran 10,000 simulations for each model recording in each case the simulation run 
parameters (sampled as described above) and the moving average for the relevant dependent 
variables.   
In smaller sample of runs to check for the system’s sensitivity to some of our choices, we 
increased the number of generations and varied both the number of groups and the length of the 
moving average across which we recorded data. None of these modifications affected our 
substantive results.   
 
                                                 
6   Four is an arbitrary number; running the simulation with two, three and more than four groups 
made no fundamental difference to our findings.  
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Findings 
With the domain general model we observed a modest but significant selection on 
altruism. This is shown in Figure 1, which is a frequency distribution for evolved altruism. The 
horizontal axis specifies the altruism level averaged across the last 100 generations and the 
vertical axis records the density of cases across the randomized parameter space. The mean  
altruism value in this positively skewed distribution is 0.25 (the median is 0.17), interpretable as 
the mean individual being 25% altruistic—or, alternatively, that the mean individual would have 
a .25 probability of contributing to group members’ fitness, thus to the group’s population 
growth, via its communitarian activities and a .25 probability of fighting heroically in any war 
that its group had to fight.  
 Despite the fact that both behavioral components of the general purpose attribute altruism 
are reproductively costly to individuals, therefore, we do observe some selection on that 
attribute.  Agents pay a reproductive cost proportional to the strength of their generalized 
disposition to altruism, but this cost is outweighed by the benefits the individual reaps from the 
group’s success in warfare.  Multiple regression of ending altruism values on parameters in the 
model shows a negative association between evolved altruism and (1) the cost of altruism, (2) the 
average size of group resource bases (hence, the average size of groups), and (3) variation in 
resource base size (hence, variation in size among the groups); it also shows a positive 
association between altruism and the frequency of war (see Appendix II).  This suggests that 
higher (and less typical) evolved values of altruism occurred in runs in which the cost of altruism 
was low, groups were smaller and more equal in size, and wars were frequent.  
 With the domain specific model, in which  communitarianism and heroism were free to 
evolve as separate attributes, Figures 2a and 2b show that: (1) heroism evolved to substantially 
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higher levels than communitarianism with means of 66.9% and 30.5% and medians of 70.3 and 
22.6 respectively, and  (2) both attributes evolved to significantly higher levels than did altruism 
in the domain general model. There are, therefore, three findings to be explained—first, the fact 
that there was some positive selection on general purpose altruism, despite its costs to the 
individual; second, the stronger selection on heroism than on communitarianism; and third, that 
when communitarianism and heroism are free to evolve separately, both evolve to higher levels 
than when they are combined as expressions of a single, general purpose altruism attribute.  We 
will address the evolution of general purpose altruism (the first finding) shortly; first we discuss 
the relative evolution of the two domain specific forms (findings two and three). 
 
Why does heroism evolve to higher levels than communitarianism?   
 To this point in the analysis, heroism has only entailed a cost in the event of war.  Given 
that war is only a sometime thing7 while communitarianism occurs in every generation, perhaps 
heroism evolves to a higher level simply because the cost of heroism is paid less frequently than 
the cost of communitarianism. 
This does appear to be part of the story.  Figure 3 reports the distribution of heroism 
when the cost of heroism is paid every generation rather than only in the event of war.  With the 
mean of this distribution now at .475 (as opposed to .669 in the original model), clearly this cost 
difference accounts for some of the relatively greater selection on heroism—but it is only part of 
the story, since the mean of heroism is still substantially higher than the .305 mean of   
communitarianism in the original model.  
                                                 
7 In fact, averaged across all runs, it happens to any given group with a probability very close to 
.5  in every generation.   
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Another part concerns the immediacy of the benefits to fighting capacity that a group 
reaps from communitarianism and heroism. Since reproduction happens at the end of each 
generation, communitarianism increases the number of fighters a group will be able to field in 
the next generation while heroism increases a group’s fighting capacity in the present one. Thus 
communitarianism can only increase a group’s future fighting ability—assuming the group 
survives any wars in the current generation, which will depend on group size and heroism now.  
Notice that the delayed effect of communitarianism is consistent with real-life population 
dynamics; since infants and young children confer no advantage in war, the war-fighting benefits 
of increased fertility cannot be realized immediately.  
 Communitarianism is also a “two-edged sword” for a group’s fighting ability.  While it 
does contribute to a group’s (future) fighting ability, its effect on population growth can also be 
responsible for getting that group into war in the first place—in which case there is some chance 
of its losing, thus of consequent selection against communitarianism. Heroism, on the other 
hand, is an unambiguous good for a group:  In the absence of war—and assuming its cost is only 
paid in the event of war—it does no harm to the individual or the group, but in the event of war it 
can be decisive in allowing the group to win. 
 Ultimately, selection on communitarianism and on heroism must be a function of whether 
the behavior produced by those dispositions is “critical” to the group’s success in warfare, and 
while both contributions might be critical for the outcome of a given war, it appears that heroism 
is more likely to be critical than communitarianism.  
Why, then, does altruism evolve? 
 The positive selection on general purpose altruism in the single attribute model, modest 
as it is, can now be explained in the same way as selection on heroism and communitarianism in 
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the two attribute model.  Altruists fight for their groups, and a given altruist’s fighting can be 
critical for the group’s survival, thus for the altruist’s own survival.  Similarly—although with a 
lower probability—an altruist’s communitarian behaviors might also be critical for such survival 
via the role that numbers as such can play in outcome of wars. 
 
Why do communitarianism and heroism evolve to higher levels than general-purpose 
altruism? 
 An unexpected finding was that when they are allowed to evolve independently, both 
communitarianism and heroism evolve to higher levels than does the single, general purpose 
attribute altruism.8 Why do both functions evolve more rapidly when they are performed by two 
independent mechanisms than when they are performed by a single, general purpose 
mechanism?  
 In retrospect, at least, the explanation is clear. When a single, general purpose mechanism 
performs two distinct functions (A and B), both of which decrease individual fitness, selection 
against that mechanism based on the costs of A will also select against performance of B, and 
vice versa.  Conversely, when there are two special purpose mechanisms performing A and B, 
selection based on the individual costs of B has no implications for selection based on the costs 
of A, and vice versa.  Thus, breaking the general purpose mechanism down into two special 
purpose mechanisms means the evolution of one attribute is not handicapped by the cost of the 
                                                 
8   Outcomes of the multiple regression analysis (see Appendix II) indicate a zero correlation 
between mean evolved communitarianism and heroism values. Hence a more general tendency 
toward altruism did not evolve; nor was there any evidence of an evolved tendency of agents to 
“specialize” in one or the other form of domain-specific altruism. 
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other, improving the strength of group versus individual selection in the accounting of multi-
level selection.  Heroism, which is invoked only every second generation or so, benefits much 
more from such “de-linking of costs” than does communitarianism, which is invoked—and thus, 
if linked, extracts a cost on heroism—in every generation.     
 This finding with respect to the probable “cognitive architecture of altruism” is not, in 
itself, an answer to the classic problem of how privately costly altruistic dispositions might 
evolve; each disposition must be positively selected despite the costs that it generates for the 
acting individual.  But the finding does raise the possibility that thinking about altruism as a 
bundle of special purpose forms of altruist behaviors—each evoked in some circumstances but 
not in others—and not as a single general purpose disposition evoked regardless of the 
contextual specifics, will prove a fruitful path to follow. 
 
Does heroism depend on “constant” battles? 
 The case for humans’ past being one of “constant battles” becomes increasingly difficult 
to make the further back in time one looks and, as discussed above, this has fueled arguments 
about just how “constant” warfare—however that might be defined—actually was in our 
ancestral past.  Whatever the facts of the matter, our findings about the evolution of heroism turn 
out not to be critically dependent on the frequency of warfare.  For the simulation data, we 
regressed mean heroism for the last 100 generations on the overall frequency of war.9 Even with 
the power afforded by an n of 10,000, the coefficient for number of wars was not significant (see 
                                                 
9   Along with other key input parameters that varied across the runs such as cost of heroism, the 
size of the resource base and variation in resource base size between groups. These were all 
significant negative predictors of heroism.   
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Appendix II).  As long as war does occur at least every few generations, it appears that heroism 
will evolve in response, and that such evolution is not affected by any greater frequency of 
wars—even should there be as many as several per generation.  
 One strong assumption of both simulations, which allowed us to model a period in human 
history in which groups remained relatively modest in size, was the assumption that all members 
of defeated groups were killed (or otherwise removed from the population—for example, by 
fleeing the territories occupied by our simulated groups). To examine the impact of this 
“casualty” rate in defeated groups, we turned to an analytic model.  
 
An Analytic Model of Heroism 
 Although our simulations make a range of simplifying assumptions, they are still more 
complex than what can be readily modeled analytically.  Accordingly, we have used a simplified 
analytic model to explore in a more rigorous fashion the impact of a few key parameters on the 
evolution of a propensity for heroism.  The cost of this precision was to reduce the number of 
groups from four to two equally sized groups and to model heroism as a dichotomous variable 
with each agent being either fully heroic or a complete coward.  (See Appendix III for a formal 
description of the model.) 
 As noted above, the simulation results are based on the strong assumption that a defeated 
group is entirely wiped out—that victors practice genocide on losers or, functionally the same 
from an evolutionary point of view, that the victors prevent the losers from reproducing (as, 
potentially, in slavery, for example)10 or that the losers otherwise vanish from the population of 
                                                 
10  In our simulation, genocide in the event of defeat is the only way that agents die. When we 
tried reducing the level of genocide, exponential population growth and constant war was the 
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interest, perhaps by migrating to a distant territory.  Although the archeological record does 
suggest that genocide was at least sometimes practiced (Keeley, 1997; LeBlanc & Register, 
2003) and the elimination of a competing group has been documented in a chimpanzee 
population (Wilson & Wrangham, 2003), we simply do not know just how pervasive this 
outcome was.  Nevertheless, one potentially problematic consequence of the strong genocide 
assumption in our simulations is that a hero whose efforts are critical for his own side’s victory is 
also averting, with certainty, his own death in defeat.  What happens to selection on heroism 
when that assumption is relaxed? 
 In the analytic model, any individual’s probability of surviving a war is defined by 1 – 
dG, when d is the probability of the group’s being defeated (a function of the relative summed 
heroism scores in the contending groups) and G is the proportion of the defeated group that is 
killed (the genocide parameter).  At one extreme, therefore, if the genocide parameter is 1.0 (the 
entire defeated group will be killed), then an individual hero’s actions can be critical not only for 
the group’s survival, but also for his own—as in the simulation.  At the other extreme, if the 
genocide parameter is zero then all individuals survive the war despite their defeat,11 and a 
hero’s actions, while  costing him personally in reproductive terms, do not promote his own 
                                                                                                                                                             
result, along with a vastly increased demand on computational resources that made large 
numbers of runs of 1000 generations impractical. With G = 1, however, population size remains 
more or less constant, cycling around the same mean.  Accordingly, for this analysis of genocide, 
we have relied exclusively on the analytic results.  
11   Note that we are equating “surviving the war” with retaining the potential for reproduction—
not inevitable, of course, in the event a defeated population is enslaved.  In our evolutionary 
model retaining the potential for reproduction is the critical issue.  
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survival. In short, heroism is more likely to evolve when genocide (or at least, a very high 
casualty rate) is the outcome for defeated groups, ceteris paribus.   
 The analytic model demonstrates that the equilibrium proportion of heroes, q*, at which 
it is equally beneficial to be a hero or a coward, depends not only on genocide rates, but also on 
the overall population size, n (Figure 4, see also Proposition 3 and related proof in Appendix III).   
As the population size increases, the slope of the curve flattens and the equilibrium proportion of 
heroes for a given level of genocide declines. Intuitively, the larger the population, the less likely 
it will be that any given heroic contribution will be critical to the group’s survival—thus also to 
the survival of the hero himself.  The result is, of course, compatible with the well-recognized 
relationship between group size and the rationality of contributing to public goods in general 
(Buchanan, 1968; Olson, 1965).12  It also matches the finding from the simulation results that 
heroism evolves to higher levels when groups are smaller. 
 The analytic results indicate (and Figure 4 illustrates) that the equilibrium proportion of 
heroes falls off steeply as the casualty rate for the losing side declines from complete genocide to 
most group members surviving (toward the left of the graphic). If we assumed that casualty rates 
were unbiased across that distribution—and, as we have argued, we simply don’t know the facts 
of the matter—it would follow that the selective pressures of war favored the evolution of 
                                                 
12   In the analytical model, the total population consists of two groups, so the curves in Figure 4 
correspond to group sizes of 25, 50, and 100.  In the simulation runs reported above (in which G 
=1), the average resource base size (which constrains group size) was 75 (and ranged from 50 to 
100), with mean evolved values of  heroism of .475 and .669, depending, respectively, on 
whether the cost of heroism was paid per generation or per war.  
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heroism as a relatively rare phenomenon among humans (or, at least, as a low probability 
behavior among all individuals). 
Summary and Conclusions 
 Using simulation, we have shown that heroism—a willingness to fight for one’s group 
even when it places oneself at a reproductive disadvantage relative to other group members—can 
evolve within a population of groups that, at least sometimes, go to war with each other over 
scarce resources needed for individual and group survival.  The simulation in which agents are 
characterized by a general purpose altruism supporting both “communitarianism” and “heroism” 
produces modest positive selection on that attribute.  When agents are characterized by two 
independent, special purpose attributes heroism and communitarian, however, both of those 
attributes evolve to higher levels than does general purpose altruism, with heroism evolving to 
substantially higher levels than communitarianism.   
 An altruistic attribute can only evolve when the individual’s action returns greater private 
reproductive benefits than reproductive costs, and in the case of heroism, that is more likely (1) 
in relatively small groups when one individual’s heroism is more likely to make the difference 
between victory and defeat for the group; and (2) when defeat means a high probability that 
everyone, the hero included, will be killed by the victorious group.  Communitarianism can 
contribute to a group’s victory, thus to positive selection on communitarianism itself, since with 
heroism constant, larger groups will be more likely to win a war than smaller ones. But heroism 
is more strongly selected in part because of the immediacy of its impact on a group’s success in 
war and in part because communitarianism is a “two edged sword” that can contribute to victory, 
but can also be responsible for triggering a war that the communitarian’s group could quite 
possibly lose.  
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Our unexpected finding that communitarian and heroic dispositions, when modeled as 
separate, domain specific attributes, both evolve to higher levels than the domain general 
disposition altruism suggests a more general cost-benefit argument for the efficiency of modular 
design beyond the standard argument that a design that is optimal for solving one processing 
problem will seldom be optimal for solving another. Given that all adaptations involve costs 
(energy resources that could be used otherwise), modularity allows costs associated with solving 
one problem to be paid without qualifying the organism’s success in solving a second problem, 
which is what happens with general purpose designs. 
There are, of course, other adaptive rewards to heroism beyond the possibility of one’s 
action being critical for one’s own survival.  Most obviously, as mentioned above, the group’s 
success can mean male members’ access to the inherently scarce reproductive capacities of 
defeated females via rape and capture. Also, to the extent ancestral groups consisted substantially 
of relatively close kin, the theory of inclusive fitness (Hamilton, 1964) suggests how “genes for 
heroism” could be passed on through the survival of the hero’s relatives, even should the hero 
himself not survive;  supporting this, it is certainly true that political rhetoric seeking to mobilize 
heroism in large, complex modern societies often invokes kinship (G. Johnson, 1987). And 
cultural evolution can provide a wide range of rewards for heroic behavior including fame, 
honor, and money, all of which can translate readily into reproductive success. Our analysis 
certainly does not discount the evolutionary importance of any such processes in explaining 
human males’ willingness, even eagerness, to go to war—and their willingness, even eagerness, 
to engage in highly risky behavior while doing so.  
The model’s conclusion that heroism should evolve to higher levels in a population of 
smaller groups is, however, nicely consistent with estimates that social life in our remote past 
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was organized in groups whose size varied between only a handful to, perhaps 250 individuals at 
the outer limit (Dunbar, 1993, 1996).  In such an environment, one individual’s heroism could be 
the salvation of his group—at least sufficient to tip the balance given the relative incidence of 
heroism in two battling groups.  And although we cannot know with certainty about the 
incidence of genocide in that past, it is surely more likely that all members of a small group 
would be wiped out in the course of a war (or die off later as a consequence of defeat and the 
loss of resources and reduced group size) than those of a big one—making two of the conditions 
that we have identified as critical to the evolution of heroism during humans’ remote past almost 
certain to have been in place.    
That frequent warfare was also in place is, as we have indicated, the subject of some 
dispute among anthropologists, and there must certainly have been extensive periods when 
resource competition was substantially absent as a cause of warfare—or, at least, when migration 
was a relatively costless alternative to fighting over existing resources.  But the absence of a 
correlation between heroism and the frequency of warfare makes that argument irrelevant to the 
case presented here.  Even a little warfare, so our simulations suggest, would have gone a long 
way toward selection on heroism as an attribute of our ancient ancestors.  
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Appendix I. The Formal Structure of the Simulation. 
 A territory 1,2  is endowed with ,...g = gR  natural resources and is populated by a 
number of individuals, gn , who form a group that consumes the territory’s finite resources. Each 
territory’s resources define the limit of how many people it can support, the exogenous survival 
threshold,T : .  Should population growth cause a group’s resources per capita to fall 
below that threshold, it declares war on another group, randomly chosen. 
/g gR n T>
 Groups must fight if attacked.  Each member of a group can increase that group’s fighting 
strength by active fighting in a war, the behavior we term “heroism.”  As with 
communitarianism, we assume that heroism decreases the probability of an individual’s having 
offspring by , with cost proportional to the level of heroism.  Heroism is also a continuous 
variable, .  The group with the greater fighting strength, 
0y >
[0,1]ih ∈
1
gn
i
i
h
=
∑ , wins a war.  Members o
the losing group die or—functionally the same—vacate the broader ecology.  The winning gro
fissions, dividing its members between its original territory and the vacated territory so that 
resources per capita are equal in the two territories.   
f 
up 
 Members of all groups have the same baseline fertility, [0,1]bP ∈ , a natural probability of 
having offspring in a generation.  Baseline fertility can be adjusted for each group depending on 
its members’ average communitarianism.  With the latter incorporated, the resulting baseline 
fertility for the group becomesg b c gP P A+ , where  is the difference between purely 
communitarian and non-communitarian groups, and 
0cP >
1
1 gn
g i
i
A
n =
= c∑  is the group’s average 
communitarianism, with  being the propensity to communitarian behavior of a given 
member i . Communitarianism is costly to fertility, decreasing the probability of an individual’s 
[0,1]ic ∈
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having an offspring by ; the cost is assessed proportional to . In each generation an 
individual  reproduces depending on its probability of having an offspring.  Reproduction is 
asexual and stochastic.  It is also subject to mutation: Offspring’ attributes are copied from the 
parent subject to a uniform shock with zero mean and an exogenous variance.  In addition, with a 
very small exogenous probability, offspring attributes can be drawn from a uniform distribution 
. 
0x > ic
i
U[0,1]
 Combining the factors above, the probability of member i of a surviving group having an 
offspring is b c g i iP P A c x h yw+ − − , where 0,1,...w =  is the number of wars.  Thus, within a single 
group more communitarian individuals always have a lower probability of reproducing. The 
same is true for more heroic individuals if 0w ≠ .  However, groups whose members are 
relatively more communitarianism and heroic grow faster.  Faster growth means the group will 
reach the limits of its resource base more rapidly, but larger groups are also more likely to win 
wars.  The domain general model is identical except that [0,1]ic ∈  is both a propensity to 
communitarian behavior and to heroic participation in wars. 
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Appendix II. Multiple Regression. 
Statistical analysis of the multiple simulation runs provides further evidence that 
cooperation and heroism are two distinct forms of altruism, subject to distinct adaptive pressures 
(Table AII.)  Growth difference describes the growth advantage that more cooperative groups 
have over less cooperative groups.  In general, the larger the growth difference, the sooner more 
cooperative groups will become overpopulated, experience resource stress, and attack other, 
possibly less populated, groups. In the two attribute model this variable has a significant positive 
effect on the evolution of cooperation, but a significant negative effect on the evolution of  
 
Table A.II. Effect of parameters of environment on altruism, cooperation, 
and heroism 
Dependent Variable Altruism Cooperation Heroism 
Growth Difference 0.003 0.061** -0.008* 
Wars 0.497** 0.404** -0.001 
Cost (Altruism) -0.373**   
Cost (Cooperation)  -0.572** -0.001 
Cost (Heroism)  -0.003 -0.183** 
Resources Mean -0.322** -0.513** -0.115** 
Resources Std. Dev. -0.170** -0.049** -0.144** 
Constant -0.381 -1.135** -0.265 
Observations 9950 9919 9919 
R-squared 0.63 0.55 0.19 
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heroism.  In the one attribute model, however, growth difference appears to have no effect on the 
evolution of altruism. The reason for this difference is that, in the two-attribute case, wars can be 
decided by a difference in group size that swamps the impact of heroism—viz., a large group of 
not-so-heroic fighters can defeat a small band of more heroic ones.  In the one attribute case, 
however, generalized altruism captures both (opposing) effects, making the growth difference 
falsely appear insignificant.  
Dependent and independent variables are analyzed in the form of natural logarithms.  In 
double log form, regression coefficients can be interpreted as elasticities measuring the 
percentage change in the dependent variable for a one percent change in an independent variable 
with other variables constant.  Other statistical specifications lead to substantively similar results.  
One star indicates significance at 5%; two stars indicate significance at 1%. Cases when the 
dependent variable was zero were dropped from the double log specification. 
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Appendix III. An Analytic Model of Heroism. 
 The following simple analytic model specifies the logic by which multi-level selection 
via warfare can select for the individual attribute heroism.  
 Imagine a world with two equally-sized groups.  In this simple world, heroism is a binary 
variable—there are only heroes and non-heroes.  All individuals, regardless of their type, have a 
baseline fitness .  Heroism, however, is costly whenever invoked, and thus decreases a 
hero’s baseline fitness by .  Therefore, the fitness of a hero is
[0,1]bP ∈
0c > H bP P c= − ; conversely, the 
fitness of a non-hero is ~H bP = P .  Clearly, within a group the fitness of non-heroes is always 
greater than the fitness of heroes, ~H HP P> , as long as . 0c >
 Can heroism evolve?  To answer this question we introduce between-group competition. 
Assume that the two groups in the model periodically fight with each other and the group with 
more heroes wins the conflict.  Members of the winning group survive while losers die out 
completely; they are the victims of genocide.  Thus, although at the individual level we have a 
clear selection on non-heroism, at the group level we have a clear selection on heroism.   
 Define d  as an exogenous probability that a group to which an individual belongs will 
be defeated in a war if this individual does not fight, i.e., not a hero.  The probability  is a 
function of the distribution of heroes across the whole world.  Being a member of the defeated 
group, however, does not guarantee death.  If genocide is not total, some members of the losing 
group will survive the war.  Let  describe the proportion of those in the defeated group 
who are killed.  When G = 0, everyone in the losing group survives; when G = 1, everyone in the 
losing group dies.  As a result, a non-hero’s baseline fitness, , is contingent upon the likelihood 
of surviving a war, : 
d
[0,1]G∈
bP
( )1 dG−
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(1) . ( )~ 1H bP P dG= −
 By being a hero, an individual may affect the likelihood that his group wins a war, thus 
allowing all members—himself included—to survive, but such heroic behavior comes at a 
personal reproductive cost.  The particular impact that an individual’s heroism has on his group’s 
likelihood of winning a war depends on the number of people fighting heroically.  For example, 
if there are no other heroes at all, an individual will decide the outcome of war by himself—with 
certainty.  On the other hand, if heroes are common, an individual’s impact may be trivial.  
Define  as a proportion of heroes in the world (across the two groups)  q
(2) 
1
1 n
i
i
q h
n =
= ∑ , 
where  is the total world population, and n [0,1]ih =  is the type of individual i , 1 if a hero, 0 if a 
non-hero.  Using combinatorics we can establish that the probability that an individual hero will 
make a difference to the outcome of a war is  
(3) , 
( )
( )11 2
1 / 2
qnqnv
qn
− −−⎛ ⎞= ⎜ ⎟−⎝ ⎠
which can be approximated by 1v
qn
= .  
 If an individual is not decisive, then his fitness is weighted by the exogenous probability 
of survival .  However, when an individual is critical, his group wins and the probability 
of survival is1.  Thus, the expected fitness of a hero is equal to: 
(1 dG− )
(4) ( )( )( )( ) ( )1 1H b bP P c dG v P c= − − − + − v . 
 The first term in the formula describes a case when the hero is not decisive and the 
second term describes a case when he is.  
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When , i.e., a hero is extremely unlikely to be decisive, the fertility of cowards, 
, is dominating the fertility of heroes, 
0v →
(~ 1H bP P dG= − ) ( )( )1H bP P c dG= − − . 
When , i.e., a hero is decisive, the fertility of heroes, 1v → H bP P c= − , is greater than 
fertility of cowards, , if ( )~ 1H bP P dG= − bc P dG< . 
For all other cases, evolutionary success of a type depends on the criticalness of heroism 
1v
qn
= . Using expressions (1) and (2), we can establish when the population becomes 
homogeneously non-heroic, ~H HP P> , homogeneously heroic, ~H HP P> , or heterogeneous 
~H HP P= .  The fitness formulas (1) and (2) were derived without taking into account group 
membership.  However, since an individual is equally likely to belong to either of the groups, the 
fitness formulas for heroes and non-heroes across the two groups become: 
(5.1) ( ),1 .2 / 2H H HP P P= + , 
(5.2) , ( )~ ~ ,1 ~ .2 / 2H H HP P P= +
where  
(6.1) ( )( )( )( ) ( ),1 1 1H b bP P c dG v P c= − − − + − v , 
(6.2) ( ) ( )( )( )( ) ( ),2 1 1 1H b bP P c d G v P c= − − − − + − v , 
(6.3) ~ ,1 (1 )H bP P dG= − , 
(6.4) ( )~ ,2 (1 1 )H bP P d= − − G . 
 The expressions 6.1 – 6.4 describe the fitness of heroes and non-heroes belonging to 
groups 1 and 2.  For example, ,1HP  is a fitness of a hero from group 1. 
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 Using (5.1) and (5.2) we can solve for an equilibrium proportion of heroes in the whole 
population, .  Since an individual is equally likely to belong to either group, assume that 
.  Then there is a unique equilibrium: 
*q
0.5m =
(7) ( )
( )
2
*
2
bG P cq
G c n
⎛ ⎞−
= ⎜ ⎟⎜ ⎟−⎝ ⎠
. 
 Figure 4 in the main text represents the equilibrium proportion of heroes  as a 
function of genocide G  at different population sizes. 
*q
 Having found the equilibrium proportion of heroes in the population, we can characterize 
the equilibrium in greater detail making several propositions. 
Proposition 1: The equilibrium proportion of heroes  is evolutionary stable. *q
Proof. The equilibrium proportion of heroes in the world, expression (7), solves ~H HP P= , 
where HP  and ~HP  are defined as in (5.1) and (5.2) respectively.  The solution is unique.  * 0q <  
implies that the equilibrium proportion of heroes in the world is strictly zero.   implies that 
the proportion is exactly one.   
* 1q >
 The unique equilibrium is evolutionary stable.  Any minor deviations from the 
equilibrium proportion result in return to the equilibrium. Since ~H HP P>  for all , and *q q<
~H HP P>  for all , we have an evolutionary stable equilibrium . Graphically, the 
evolutionary stability of the equilibrium is shown in Figure A.III. 
*q q> *q
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Figure A.III. Illustration of the equilibrium proportion of heroes .  Fitness of heroes, *q
HP , and non-heroes, ~HP , as a function of , the proportion of heroes across both groups.  
The equilibrium is evolutionary stable because of the converging dynamics. 
q
 
Proposition 2: There is a homogeneously non-heroic population only when either  
(1) There is no killing in wars. 
(2) The cost of heroism is equal or greater than the baseline probability of having an 
offspring. 
Proof. Evident from (7):  when * 0q = 0G =  or bP c= . 
Proposition 3: The equilibrium proportion of heroes is increasing in genocide and baseline 
fitness, and decreasing in the population size and the cost of heroism. 
Proof. Using the equilibrium formula (7) we can derive the following comparative statics: 
( )
( )
2
3 2
2 2* 0
2
bG P cq
G G nc
−∂
= >
∂ −
, ( )
( )
2
2 2
2 2* 0
2
b
b
G P cq
P G nc
−∂
= >
∂ −
,  
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( )
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bG P cq
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∂ −
, 
( )
( )
2
2 3
2* 0
2
b bP G c Pq
c G nc
−∂
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Figure 1. 
Density distribution of evolved altruism in the one-attribute model. Mean altruism = 0.250. 
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Figure 2a. 
Density distribution of evolved heroism in the two-attribute model.  Mean heroism = 0.669. 
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Figure 2b. 
Density distribution of evolved communitarianism in the two-attribute model. Mean 
communitarianism = 0.305. 
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Figure 3. 
Density distribution of evolved heroism in when the cost of heroism is paid every 
generation. Mean heroism = 0.475. 
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Figure 4. 
Equilibrium proportion of heroes  across two groups as a function of genocide  for 
three different population sizes n, 
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